From Newsgroup: talk.politics.misc
|
| I don't know what has been presented in the White House,
| but this is the adversary status I would present, with one
| important Takeaway - At this stage, the most important
| requirement for U.S. policy is strategic realism about what
| the use of force can still achieve against Iran.
|
| 1. Iran's leadership is not interested in prolonging the
| war, but it believes it holds an advantage in a "pain
| tolerance" competition vis-a-vis the United States and the
| international community.
|
| 2. Threats of force are unlikely to produce meaningful
| concessions in negotiations. Iran is expected to hold
| firmly to the red lines it has maintained from the outset.
|
| 3. Maritime pressure will not compel Iranian capitulation.
| Absent an agreement, it is more likely to lead to direct
| confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. Interdictions of
| Iranian shipping may accelerate escalation, but not
| surrender.
|
| 4. The current Iranian leadership will not give up uranium
| enrichment, its missile program, support for its regional
| network of proxies, or its strategic influence over the
| Strait of Hormuz.
|
| 5. Limited strikes will not alter this trajectory. Tehran
| is not easily swayed by signaling. A broader campaign
| against Iran's civilian infrastructure could severely
| damage its economy, but would almost certainly trigger
| wide-scale retaliation, particularly against energy
| infrastructure across the Gulf.
|
| 6. Without regime change, which would require a dramatic
| U.S. investment in time, resources, and political will,
| these core dynamics are unlikely to shift.
|
| 7. Decision-making in Iran is becoming more fragmented and
| hardline, increasingly shaped by the IRGC. This makes
| coherent compromise more difficult than in the past.
|
| 8. What Iran did not concede before or during the conflict,
| it is even less likely to concede now, regardless of
| military pressure or blockade measures.
|
| 9. In the absence of a deal, escalation is not a risk, it
| is the default trajectory. Iran is already preparing for
| it, including efforts to rebuild and reinforce its missile
| capabilities.
|
| 10. To date, even successful operational achievements have
| not meaningfully changed Iran's strategic calculus.
| Paradoxically, the campaign has weakened Iran economically,
| but strengthened the regime internally, especially among
| the regime supporters.
|
| +1
|
| The administration seems to have two main options: a
| framework agreement broadly resembling the previous nuclear
| deal, Or a wider escalation would impose massive economic
| costs on Iran, but rather than restrain it, it could drive
| a significant expansion of its escalatory actions.
|
<
https://xcancel.com/citrinowicz/status/2045592885362340027>
--bks
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